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We demonstrate that a firm subject to government regulation might expect an increase in profit 
upon creation of an independent monopoly upstream. Such a monopoly serves to increase the 
expected cost of the regulated firm. As a result, even regulators who behave socially optimally 
will decrease the frequency with which they audit reports of high production-cost. The reduction 
in governmental investigation permits the firm to increase the rents it derives from its superior 
information about cost. The possible implications of our model for a theory of 'political limit 
pricing' are also briefly mentioned. 
1. Introduction 
When the prices of its inputs rise, a firm's profit falls. In compet i t ive  
markets,  this basic intui t ion is usually confirmed. Where market  power  exists, 
however, intuit ion can mislead. F o r  example, as Wil l iamson (1968) shows, 
an increase in the wage rate can protect  capital-intensive incumbents  from 
the potential compet i t ion  of labor-intensive rivals. Salop and Scheffman 
(1983) have also demons t ra ted  the importance of raising rivals' costs when 
at tempting to erect barriers to new competi t ion.  Such at tempts  could  involve 
increases in the cost of  the firm itself. 
In this article, we develop a complementary  explanat ion of the profitabili ty 
of raising input prices. Our  explanat ion stresses the impact  of governmenta l  
regulation on the firm's behavior.  Fo r  a variety of reasons, governments  are 
often prepared to intervene in industries to limit the gap between price and 
(some measure of) cost. Intervent ion occurs in our  model  when its expected 
social benefit exceeds its social cost. In this setting, an increase in the firm's 
expected costs can reduce the expected social benefit of  government  regula- 
*The views expressed in this paper are not necessarily those of Bell Communications 
Research. We are grateful to the Editorial Board and anonymous referees for helpful comments. 
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tion; and the reduced intervention that results can increase the profit of the 
firm. In other words, from the firm's perspective, the direct reduction in 
profit that ensues from higher expected input  prices can be more than offset 
by the increase in profit that results from less stringent government  control. 
This possibility is established in section 3.1 
Although we cannot  claim that our simple model  is sufficiently rich to 
analyze industries of realistic complexity, we do believe our  analysis can 
inform studies of cost control in regulated industries. Furthermore,  the same 
basic insight might apply to industries under  the threat of potential 
government control3 We shall return to this point,  albeit briefly, in section 
4. The analysis begins in section 2 with the benchmark case of an 
unregulated monopolist.  
2. Unregulated environment 
In this section, we examine a monopolist  whose behavior is not  subject to 
governmental  regulation. We do so to clarify the impact of regulation per se 
in section 3, The cost function of the monopol is t  is C(Q)=F+cQ, where 
F > 0  and c > 0  are parameters, and Q is the level of output.  Demand  for the 
firm's product  is given by Q(P), where p is the uni t  price, and dQ/dp<O. 
Initially, because of residual uncertainty about  input  prices, the mono-  
polist's costs are not known perfectly. We capture this uncertainty simply by 
allowing the parameter c to take on one of two values, ct or c2, where 
e2 > c l .  The probabili ty that c=cl is 4~i, where ~i2=1q5~= 1, The greater the 
value of qSz, the greater the expected cost of production.  
The cost uncertainty is resolved for the monopol is t  before he selects the 
price for his product. Knowing  F, c, and Q(p), he chooses p so as to 
maximize profit? We let II~=-[pT-ci]Q(p~)-F represent the maximum 
profit the firm can earn in an unregulated envi ronment  with marginal  cost c~. 
p~' denotes the price that secures the profit level H7 when marginal  cost is c~. 
In the unregulated environment,  the firm's expected profit before produc- 
tion costs are known perfectly is denoted EII"=qblH"I +qbzlI ~. Thus, Eli  u is 
lLet us be clear from the outset as to why we assume the government acts to promote 
economic efficiency. Certainly there are alternative theories of government behavior: for example, 
those based on the government's inability to formulate policies consistent with its goals, and 
those based on the government's capture by those it regulates. Under such theories, it would not 
be surprising to find that a regulated firm can increase its profit by increasing the costs of its 
operation. In contrast, when government is inspired solely by economic efficiency, the 
profitability to a regulated firm of increasing its expected cost is not obvious. In short, we 
choose an objective for government that does not facilitate unduly our intended demonstration. 
2For example, the argument developed here explains how the international petroleum 
corporations could conceivably have gained from the creation Of OPEC, even had the 
corporations owned no crude, and even had OPEC not served to  stabilize oligopolistic 
agreements downstream. 
3The superscript u denotes the 'unregulated' environment. 
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simply a weighted average of the firm's profits under the two possible cost 
realizations. Since H~ > H~, expected profit declines as the probability of high 
cost rises. Hence, in an unregulated environment, the profit-maximizing firm 
will never strictly prefer the creation of an independent monopoly upstream 
if the sole effect of the upstream monopolist is to increase expected 
downstream production costs, i.e., to increase ~b 2. This is how we model the 
creation of a monopoly upstream. 
3. Regulated environment 
Now suppose the monopolist of section 2 is subject to government 
regulation. In particular, suppose there is a regulator who is charged with 
setting the price the firm can charge. Regulation is a nontrivial exercise here 
because the regulator is not perfectly informed about the monopolist's cost 
structure. At the time when the terms of the regulatory policy are announced, 
the regulator knows the distribution of costs (i.e., c=c~ with probability q5 i, 
i=1,2), but not the actual realization of c. This is in contrast to the 
monopolist who has learned the level of marginal cost by this time. However, 
the regulator can discover the firm's costs through an audit that requires an 
expenditure, I ( > 0). 4 
In addition to deciding when to audit the firm, the regulator sets the price 
(p) the firm can charge for its output and the magnitude of taxes (T) the firm 
must pay. ( T < 0  implies that the firm receives a subsidy.) 5 We assume the 
regulator can commit to carry out the terms of any announced regulatory 
policy. The policy announced by the regulator stipulates the probability (at) 
that a report by the firm that marginal cost is ci will be investigated (i.e., 
audited at cost I )  6 The policy also specifies allowed prices based upon the 
firm's cost report and the outcome of the investigation, if one is conducted. Pl 
is the allowed price if costs are reported to be ci and no investigation of the 
report follows. Pij is the allowed price if ci is reported, and an audit reveals 
that costs are actually c i, Associated lump sum taxes are given by T~ and T~j, 
respectively. The regulatory policy is designed to maximize expected con- 
sumers' surplus. 7 
aAn alternative approach would be to allow the probability of determining the firm's true 
costs to be a strictly increasing function of auditing expenditures, This and other extensions of 
our model are noted in section 4. 
51ntroducing lump sum taxes and transfers (or two-part tariffs) as policy instruments simplifies 
the analysis. These instruments allow marginal cost prices to serve as the relevant benchmark, as 
subsidies can then ensure the profitability of the regulated enterprise. However, allowing the 
regulator to tax and subsidise is not necessary to establish our major conclusion. 
6Related models in which the regulator can audit cost reports are those of Baron (1984), 
Baron and Besanko (1984), and Demski et al. (1987). 
7The basic insights recorded below are unaltered if the regulator's objective is to maximize the 
expected value of a weighted average of consumers' surplus and profits, provided the former is 
afforded more weight than the latter. The special case we consider is chosen for expositional 
simplicity. 
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There are two major constraints on the regulatory policy. First, the 
expected profit of the firm must be non-negative. This insures that the profit- 
maximizing monopolist will find it rational to continue operating. Second, 
the realized profit of the firm must not fall felow the level (B<0) the firm 
could secure by declaring bankruptcy. This prevents the regulator from 
establishing such an immense penalty for a false cost report that the 
probability, and hence expected cost, of auditing necessary to ensure truthful 
cost reports approach zero. Effectively, this assumption enforces the asym- 
metry of information between firm and regulator. 
To characterize the regulator's problem formally, we focus on that 
equilibrium in which the firm is induced to truthfully report its cost 
parameter to the regulator. The Revelation Principle [e.g., Myerson (1979)] 
ensures there is no loss of generality in doing so. Thus, the regulator's 
problem (RP) is: 
2 
Maximize ~ ~b i {a~[ CS(pu) + T . -  I] + [1 - a l ]  [ CS(p~) + Ti]} 
p,T,a i = l  
subject to (RP) 
aflt(cilci)+[1--a,]FINt(cdc,)>=O, i=1,2 ,  (IR3 
a ill'(cilc ,) + [ 1 -- at] Ilm(ci J ci) ~ adH'(cjJci) + [ 1 - aj] nNt(cjIci), 
jC - i . i , j= l . 2 ,  (TT~j) 
Hl(cjlci)>B, Vi, j = I , 2 .  (B[j) 
Hm(ci [ci) > B, i = 1, 2, (B~ I) 
where IP(cjt c,) = [pj , -  c,] Q(pj,) - F - Tj,, and Hm(cjI c,) = [ p j -  cJ  Q(pj) - F -  
Tj. 
The individual rationality (IR) constraint ensures the firm with marginal 
cost ci a non-negative level of expected profits. The truth-telling (TT~j) 
constraints guarantee that the firm's expected profits are greater when it 
truthfully reports its cost parameter ci than when it claims cj. (B[ i) and (BU r) 
denote the aforementioned bankruptcy constraints when investigation does 
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occur, and when it doesn' t  respectively. 8 17~(cslc3 represents the firm's profit 
level when an investigation accurately reveals c=c~, following a report of c s. 
IJN'(cslc~) is the corresponding profit when no investigation occurs. 
If the regulator shared the firm's cost information,  he would implement the 
first-best outcome, in which (a) price and marginal  cost are equated, i.e., 
p~=c~, i =  1,2; (b) there is no investigation of the firm's costs (since they are 
already known to the regulator), i.e., a t=0 ,  i =  1, 2; and (c) the firm earns no 
rents, i.e., IT[NI(ci]ct)=O, i= 1,2. 9 
Absent perfect knowledge of the firm's costs, the regulator will have to 
sacrifice some resources to deter the firm from exaggerating its costs. 
Deterrence can be effected in two ways. The direct approach consists of 
investigating a claim by the firm that c = c  2. This strategy entails a cost I to 
the regulator. The indirect strategy of deterrence consists of responding to a 
statement of c = c2 by setting P2 > c2 and adjust ing the lump sum tax on the 
firm to avoid any profit increase. The resulting decrease in output  below the 
first-best level (Q(p2)<Q(c2)) serves to reduce the profit enjoyed by the 
monopolis t  with actual cost cl if he reports c = c z  and is not  audited. Thus, 
the output  reduction limits the gains to the firm of an unaudited cost 
exaggeration. This indirect approach to l imiting the firm's incentive to 
exaggerate cost entails no investigating expenses; but, in comparison with 
marginal  cost pricing, does entail a reduction in consumers '  surplus. 
There are circumstances under  which the regulator will employ only the 
indirect method of deterrence. The optimal manner  in which to do so is 
recorded in Lemma 1) ° The proofs of Lemma 1 and all subsequent findings 
are in the appendix. 
Lemma 1 When a 2 = 0  in the solution to (RP): 
(i) p2=c2 +((91/d?2)[c2-cl]; and 
(ii) Um(c l  1ci) = IIm(c2 ]c t) > Hm(c2 I c2) = 0. 
If the firm's report of c2 is never investigated directly, the firm will earn a 
profit if actual cost is low (cO. This profit will be smaller, though, the more 
likely is marginal  cost to be cl. With q5 t close to uni ty and ~b 2 close to zero, 
8The only bankruptcy constraint not implied by this formulation of (RP) is HNI(ClIC2)~ B. As 
the proof of Proposition 1 (below) makes clear, if the firm's marginal cost is c 2, it will strictly 
prefer to report as such rather than claim c=cl. Hence, in equilibrium, this additional 
bankruptcy constraint will not be violated in the solution to (RP). 
91n equating first-best and marginal cost prices, we abstract from distortions that may arise in 
taxing consumers to raise the revenues to cover any fixed cost of production. 
1°In Lemma 1 and throughout, we assume without essential loss of generality that 
Q(c2 +(4~d¢~2)[c2 -Cl])>O. 
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the expected loss in consumers '  surplus that results from setting a high value 
for P2 is small relative to the expected reduction in the firm's profit. 
When the costs of condit ional  investigation are not  too large, the regulator 
wilt supplement the indirect form of deterrence with the direct form. The 
conditions under which audit ing is opt imal  are recorded in Lemma 2. 
Lemma 2. a2 >0  in the solution to (RP) when C S ( c 2 ) -  
C S ( c 2 + ( ¢ 1 / ¢ 2 ) [ c z - c l ] ) > I .  a 2 = 0  when the direction of  the inequality is 
reversed. 
Selective investigation of reports of high cost allows the regulator to more 
closely approximate first-best pricing. Provided the marginal  benefit of 
lowering P2 toward c 2 exceeds the marginal  cost of auditing, the optimal 
regulatory policy will set a 2 >0.  In fact, when investigation of reported high 
costs is optimal, it will be conducted to the point  where the firm's expected 
profit is reduced to its first-best level. This observat ion is recorded as 
property (iv) in Proposit ion 1, 
Proposition 1. When C S ( ¢ 2 ) - C S ( c 2 - - } - ( ~ ) 1 / ~ 9 2 ) [ c 2 - ¢ 1 ] ) > l  , the solution to 
(RP) has the following properties: 
(i) p i=c l ,p21=Q,p22=c2;  
(ii) CS(c2) - CS(p2) = I, and P2 = cz + a(¢ 1/?pz) [c 2 - c l ]  where c~ e (0, 1); 
(iii) al = 0 , 0 < a 2 <  1; 
(iv) I Im(c l  ]cl) = a2I-1'(c 2 [c2) + [1 - a2]FIN'(c2[c2) = 0; 
(v) rl~(c~lcO=B. 
Whenever the firm reports low cost, and whenever the regulator audits 
cost, price and marginal cost are equated. 11 Reports  of low cost are never 
investigated, and the firm never has an incentive to understate actual cost. 
Property (ii) of Proposi t ion 1 emphasizes the fact that the threat  of audit ing 
allows a reduction in price toward marginal  cost even when a report  of high 
11if subsidies were not feasible, prices in excess of marginal cost (Pl > c l) would be necessary 
(with F>0) to ensure non-negative profits to the low cost firm. By allowing subsidies in our 
model, we are able to distinguish most clearly between the two roles that prices play: controlling 
the firm's output level and providing revenue to the firm. It is the former role that is of greatest 
interest here. Notice that taxes are readily calculated once profit levels (contingent on cost 
realizations) and prices are specified, as they are in Proposition 1. For example, T~i= 
-r/~(cj]c~) + Loj~- c~]Q(ps~) - F. 
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cost is not investigated. Auditing is made most effective by reducing the 
actual profit of an audited liar to the bankruptcy level, as reported in 
property (v). 
Two features of the regulatory equilibrium are most important. First, the 
selectively audited firm will earn fewer rents than will the firm that is never 
audited, [Recall property (ii) of Lemma 1 and property (iv) of Proposition 
1.] Second, the probability of auditing declines to zero as the probability of 
high cost rises (see Lemma 2). These observations lead to our main finding, 
which is summarized in Proposition 2. This proposition describes the impact 
of changes in the probability of high cost on the expected profit of the firm. 
Expected profit (El l )  is defined prior to the time at which the firm learns its 
cost. Thus, E l l  = ~z~= 1 ~b,{a,ll'(c, le,) + [1 -ai3IIU'(e,]c,) }. As expected profits 
are discontinuous in (~2 at the point where CS(e2) - 
CS(c2 +(~bl/~b2)[c2-cl])=I, the proposition is stated not in terms of deriva- 
tives, but rather in terms of discrete changes (A) in q52. 
Proposition 2. Provided the inequality in Proposition 1 holds, (AE l i /  
Aq52)l¢~+q~z= 1 >0  in the solution to (RP), where the inequality is strict in some 
relevant ranges) 2 
The implication of Proposition 2 is that a regulated monopolist might 
value the formation of 'countervailing power' upstream. To the extent that 
such countervailing power serves to increase the probability of high cost, it 
can also serve to reduce the probability that the regulator will investigate 
claims of high cost. This reduction occurs for two reasons. First, as ~b 2 
increases, a report of c2 is more likely to be true. Second, the price (P2) that 
obtains following an unaudited report of high cost tends to fall as the 
expected cost of the firm rises. For both reasons, the direct expected benefits 
of auditing (i.e., reducing price to marginal cost) fall as the probability of 
high cost rises. The diminished frequency of auditing, in turn, can enhance 
the expected profit of the downstream monopolist. 
Two additional observations regarding Proposition 2 are appropriate. 
First, the result does not depend on erroneous beliefs by the regulator. 
Throughout, the regulator knows the true probabilities associated with c 1 
and c2. The expected cost of the monopolist does indeed rise; yet so does his 
expected profit. Second, it is readily verified that the firm's profit can be 
strictly enhanced even if the creation of monopoly upstream reduces the 
variance of the distribution of c. Thus, although the value of upstream 
12To be more precise, define the function F((~2)=CS(c2)-CS(c2+(fb~/(o2)[c2-ct])-l. Also, 
define the sets S+~-{~bzlF(4~2)>0} and S--= {~2]F(~bz)<0}. Then the firm's expected profits are 
strictly greater when tk2 E S- than when ~b2 ~ S +. 
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monopoly to the downstream monopolist does depend on governmental 
uncertainty regarding cost, it does not depend on the uncertainty becoming 
more pronounced as the upstream monopoly is created. 
4. Discussion 
The model analyzed here demonstrates that a profit-maximizing regulated 
firm might welcome increases in its expected costs. Its desire for such 
increases does not depend on the distortions in factor shares that arise from 
socially suboptimal regulation [-as in Averch and Johnson (1962)1. Nor does 
it depend on a desire to disadvantage the firm's rivals [as in Williamson 
(1968), Salop and Scheffman (1983), or Krattenmaker and Salop (1986)]. 
Rather, it stems from government control over prices and asymmetries in 
information regarding the firm's costs. Increases in expected input prices can 
reduce the optimal frequency of government investigation of allegedly high 
costs, leading to greater profit for the regulated firm. 
Our model is deliberately narrow in scope. It is designed to make a single 
point simply, rather than to permit satisfactory analysis of an industry of 
realistic complexity. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that the 
intuition underlying the model is quite robust. For example, although 
generalizations of the firm's cost structure and the the regulator's auditing 
technology might diminish the drama of our findings, the reported propen- 
sity for increases in expected input prices is likely to persist. 13 The same 
basic insights are also likely to characterize a corresponding dynamic model 
of regulation. Although the regulator's optimal strategy in this setting will 
generally depend on the entire history of cost reports and updated beliefs 
about likely future costs, the inverse relationship between expected costs and 
auditing frequency will persist. 
We also believe that the basic conclusion of our analysis is relevant in 
settings where regulation is depicted in potential terms. In this version of the 
story, the firm knows that an excessive discrepancy between observed price 
and externally estimated cost will result in governmental inquiry with 
positive probability, possibly leading to formal regulation. The firm would 
choose its price not to prevent entry of new sellers, but rather to prevent 
,entry of government into the pricing process, presuming the firm expects 
such entry by the government to be effective in limiting profits. In effect, an 
increase in expected input price could raise the maximum price the firm can 
13With more general cost structures and auditing technologies, it will not necessarily be the 
case that when investigation occurs, it will be so extensive as to eliminate the firm's rents, 
whatever its actual costs. Therefore, the reduced probability of audit must be weighed against 
the increased probability that actual operating costs are higher (and operating profits are 
correspondingly lower absent an audit, as they generally will be). The key point is that there are 
these two effects of higher anticipated input prices, and not just the latter effect. 
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charge  wi thou t  p r o v o k i n g  g o v e r n m e n t  action, O u r  model  thus  migh t  inform 
a theory  of 'poli t ical  l imit  pricing'34,t5 
Before apply ing  this  mode l  to actual  industries,  we would embell ish it in 
m a n y  ways. One  of these, involv ing  the t r ea tmen t  of uncer ta inty ,  meri ts  
discussion here. O ur  mode l  puts  the  firm in a posi t ion of full i n fo rma t ion  
and  the regula tor  in a pos i t ion  of subs tan t ia l  uncer ta inty .  Two i m p o r t a n t  
features of reality are thereby  ignored.  First ,  mos t  industr ies  are oligopolies 
r a the r  than  monopol ies .  Unless  col lusion is perfect, the existence of mult iple  
producers  provides  the g o v e r n m e n t  wi th  na tu ra l  b e n c h m a r k s  agains t  which  
to compa re  individual  repor t s  of inpu t  prices. As a result,  even wi thou t  costly 
invest igat ion,  the g o v e r n m e n t  migh t  possess good in fo rmat ion  regard ing  any 
par t icular  firm's cost. 
Second, in pract ice  the  firm c a n n o t  be  so cer ta in  of the consequences  of its 
actions,  Fo r  example,  r egu la to ry  responses  to increases in expected cost  
c a n n o t  be predic ted with certainty.  In par t icular ,  ne i ther  the regula tor ' s  
objectives nor  his abi l i ty to execute an  a n n o u n c e d  policy can be t aken  for 
g ran ted  by the firm. 16 
Similarly, the firm c a n n o t  be cer ta in  tha t  c rea t ion  of ' coun te rva i l ing '  power  
ups t ream entai ls  no t h i ng  m o r e  t h a n  s tochast ical ly  h igher  cost. Thus ,  a more  
comple te  model  would  include more  details  of  realistic in te rac t ions  a m o n g  
regulated firms, thei r  suppliers,  and  thei r  regulators .  
14Braff and Miller (1961) have applied this intuition to the automobile and steel industries of 
the 1950s. The argument might also be relevant to the petroleum industry of the 1970s. In 
particular, the argument is consistent with the claim that formation of OPEC enhanced the 
profits of international petroleum corporations by reducing the threat of government regulation. 
When regulation did occur, it basically followed the framework described in our model: Despite 
the information contained in prices on spot and futures markets, despite sometime regulation of 
the domestic price of crude, and despite information generated during operation of the 
entitlements program, government regulators were not well informed about the prices paid by 
specific refiners for delivered crude - especially when the seller was located abroad. In practice, 
attorneys at the administrative enforcement division of the Department of Energy (DOE) 
followed a three-step procedure while monitoring refiner prices: First, they examined invoices 
relating to purchases of crude. If the prices appeared abnormally high, the refiner would be 
audited in depth. When audits revealed attempts to overstate prices paid, DoE would attempt to 
recover overcharges on petroleum products from distorting refiners. As of March, 1986, DoE 
expected to collect $7.69 billion on overcharges for crude oil and refined products combined. 
('Lawyers for Diverse Interests Haggle in Private Over a $4 Billion Kitty of Oil-Price 
Overcharges', Wall Street Journal, March 6, 1986, p. 42.) 
15A related but distinct model is that of Fudenberg and Tirole (1986). In their model, the 
incumbent firm is interested in deterring entry by potential competitors rather than by the 
government. The incumbent gains when potential entrants acquire information that leads them 
to believe the industry is less profitable than originally anticipated. 
16A third aspect of our depiction of uncertainty that warrants additional investigation is the 
presumed auditing technology. If a 'successful' audit did not always result in perfect knowledge 
of the firm's costs, the firm would be able to command greater rents from its private 
information. 
332 W.J, Adams and D.E.M. Sappington, Profitability from 'countervailing" power 
Appendix 
Proof of  Proposition 1 and Lemma 2. Let 21, 2t~, 7~:, and Yi, represent the 
Lagrange multipliers associated with constraints (IR~), (TT~j), (B[j) and (B~X), 
respectively. Let ~ be the multiplier associated with the restriction a~=< 1. 
Also, let L~ denote the partial derivative of the Lagrangian function 
associated with (RP) with respect to variable v. Then the necessary con- 
ditions for a solution to (RP) are readily shown to include the following: 
L r ,  = ai[2i + 2ij + )'ii - ~bt] = 0, 
Lrj, = aj [2 i j -  ~'ji] = 0, 
Lr, = [ 1 - a,] { q~ + 2ji - J-)~ + 2/j + 7,] } = 0, 
Lp, = ai(~ i [Pii - ci] Q' (Pu) = O, 
i=  1,2; j # i ,  (A,1) 
i , j =  1, 2; j:~ i, (A.2) 
i = I, 2; j ~ i, (A.3) 
i=  1, 2, (A.4) 
Also, using (A.3) and noting that the derivative of CS(p) is given by -Q(p) ,  
we have 
and 
Lp,=[1 - a t ] { [ 2 i +  2ij+ y i ] [ p i - c i ] - 2 j t [ p i - c : ] }  =0, j:Ai, i=  1,2, 
(A.5) 
L,, = qSi { CS(pu) - I + T u - CSp~)-  Tz} + 2j/{ T~j. + [Pi - cj] Q(p,) - T~} 
- [ 2 1 + 2 1 i ] { T ~ i + [ p i - c , ] Q ( p i ) - T ~ } - ¢ i < O ,  j:Ai, i=1,2.  (A.6) 
We now derive the solution to (RP) assuming 221=7t=711=0.  It is 
straightforward to verify that the resulting solution does not violate any of 
the (7T20, (B~ I) or (B~I) constraints. 
Since 221 =0, Pl =cl  from (A.5). And from (A.4), P22=c2 and P11 =c l .  The 
condition corresponding to Lp~ 1 =0  reveals the level of P21 is arbitrary, so we 
can set P21 =cl ,  completing the proof of property (i) of the Proposition. 
Now suppose 212=0, Then from (A.1) and (A.3), 21=~bl. Hence, a2>0,  
since if a2=O, then from (TT12) and (IR2), a l H l ( c l t c l ) + [ 1 - a l ] H m ( e l l c t ) ~ _  
Flm(c2]cl) > llm(c2[c~) >- O, contradicting 21 > 0. If az ~ (0, 1), then 42 = 0. Also, 
yz=yz2 from (A.1) and (A.3). Because B<0,  (IRz) implies 72=72z=0.  Hence, 
22=q~ 2 from (A.1). Furthermore, from (A.5), p2=c2.  Hence, (A.6) implies 
- ~b zI = 0, which is a contradiction; Thus, if az < 1, 2t 2 > 0. 
If az--1,  then it is immediate that properties (a) and (b) of the first-best 
outcome will characterize the solution to (RP), and 212 =0. Hence, from (A.6) 
and (A,1), - d P 2 I + 7 2 2 [ T 2 2 - T 2 ] - ~ : = O .  Thus, 722>0. But since a2 = 1 and 
B<0,  we have a contradiction of (IR2). Thus, the solution to (RP) has a 2 < 1, 
so that ),12>0. And from (A,2), 712>0. 
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Now, suppose a t > 0 .  Then, not ing that 21+21z=~bl  from (A.1), (A.6) 
states - ~ h i I - ¢ 1 = 0 ,  which is a contradiction. Hence, property (iii) of 
Proposit ion 1 is proved. 
Next, if follows from (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3) that 7 1 = 2 1 z = ; q z > 0 ,  2 t +)~lz--- 
q5 t, and ~,z2=0. Property (v) of the Proposit ion follows from 71z>0,  and the 
expression for P2 in property (ii) follows from (A.5). Also, from (A.6), for 
az~(0, 1), and with pa=c2+(A12/q}2)[C2--Cl] 
CS(c2)-  CS(P2) = I. (A.7) 
If a2=O, then 21=0,  21z=01 and 2 z = l  from (A.3) and so p : =  
c2+(01/ckz)[cz-cl] from (A.5). Hence, rearranging (A.6) reveals CS(c2)-  
CS(c2 +(4J4~z)[C2-Cl]) < I. Thus, if CS(c2)-CS(c2 +(dpt/O2)[c2-cl])> I, 
az > 0. Conversely, suppose az > 0. Then, since Pz = c2 + (212/q52)[cz- cl]  and 
21z + 21 = q51, (A.7) reveals I : C S ( c 2 )  - C S ( p 2 )  ~_~ C S ( c 2 )  - 
CS(c 2 +(~bl/~b2)[c 2 - c i]  ). Therefore, if CS(c 2) - CS(c2 +(~bl/q52)[c 2 -c1-1) < I, 
az = 0. Hence Lemma 2 is proved. 
Finally, note that the solution to (RP) can only have 21 = 0  with a : > 0  if 
the razor's edge condi t ion given by (A.7) with 212=~b 1 holds. This condi t ion 
is ruled out by assumption in Proposi t ion 1. Thus, with 2 1 > 0  and 22>0,  
property (iv) of the Proposi t ion holds. 
Proof of Lemma 1. Using the notat ion developed in the proof of Proposi- 
tion 1, suppose a z = 0 .  Then it is immediate that 2 t =0 ,  so that from (A.3), 
212=~bl and 2z+72 = 1. Property (ii) of the Lemma follows from 21z>0,  and 
property (i) now follows immediately by rearranging (A.5), 
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